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Abstract - This essay examines the debate over moral justifications of state terrorism. 
Consequentialist and deontologist perspectives provide a framework to justify acts of terrorism. 
However, this framework can not absolutely be defended. By drawing on Tony Coady and Igor 
Primoratz point of views, it is argued that acts of terrorism perpetrated by the state can never be 
justified and it is morally wrong and worse than non-state terrorism.  
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Abstrak - Tulisan ini mengkaji perdebatan mengenai justifikasi moral dari terorisme negara. 
Perspektif Consequentialist dan Deontologist menyediakan kerangka teori untuk membenarkan 
tindakan terorisme. Namun demikian, kerangka teori ini tidak bisa dipertahankan secara absolut. 
Dengan menggunakan perspektif dari Tony Coady dan Igor Primoratz, tulisan ini menegaskan bahwa 
aksi terorisme yang dilakukan oleh negara tidak dapat dibenarkan dan secara moral salah bahkan 
lebih buruk dari aksi terorisme yang dilakukan oleh aktor non-negara. 
 
Kata kunci : terorisme negara, justifikasi moral, consequentialist, deontologist 
 
Introduction 
In today’s world, the term “terrorism” is prominently applied to actions by non-state 
actors or by private individuals or groups. The word “terror” was first used in relation 
with the Jacobin “Reign of Terror” following the French Revolution, instituted in 1793, in 
the case of government violence against a wide numbers of national element where the 
victims are about 17,000 civilians. Based on this political history, some scholars limit the 
definition to the government action only, in term of “state terrorism.” 
Previously, there was a clear distinction between terrorist and guerillas, and 
between non-state terrorism and state terrorism. Today, these distinctions become 
                                            
1 Penulis adalah lulusan Master of International Politics di University of Melbourne, Australia. Saat ini 
bekerja sebagai peneliti pada Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI. 
100     Jurnal Pertahanan Maret 2014, Volume 4, Nomor 1 
 
blurred and more confused than ever before. Although, we could find so many sources 
for research about state terrorism, but some criticisms stated that a study of state 
terrorism is biased or not in the mainstream study of terrorism where ultimately focus on 
non-state actors. This paper will examine the debate surrounding the study of state 
terrorism and the question of moral justifications of such actions by the state. It is argued 
that acts of terrorism perpetrated by the state can not be justified and it is morally wrong 
and worse than non-state terrorism.  
 
Defining State Terrorism 
Before discussing the concept of state terrorism, it would be valuable for us to evaluate 
the term “terrorism” previously. According to Coady, ‘[terrorism] is the organized use of 
violence to attack non-combatants (innocent in special sense) or their property for 
political purposes.’2 Moreover, Primoratz defined terrorism ‘as the deliberate use of 
violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some 
other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take.’3 Stohl defined 
terrorism as ‘the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant 
behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat.’4 From these definitions, the 
term ‘state terrorism’ could be included because it is open to the act or use  of violence 
perpetrated by state and non-state actor.   
The study of state terrorism is still marginalized in social sciences. There is only 
limited attention to focus on state terrorism by historians, sociologists and political 
scientist, and philosophers, whereas they focus too much on non-state terrorism. As Paul 
Wilkinson says : 
A particularly thorny problem in all the major contributions to the literature on terrorism has 
been the relationship between terrorism by factions and the state acts of terror…There is a 
rich and growing literature on what most authors now term state terror, but the term 
                                            
2 C.A.J. (Tony) Coady, “Defining Terrorism,” in Igor Primoratz (ed.), Terrorism The Philosophical Issues, (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 5.  
3 Ibid., p. 6.  
4 Michael Stohl, “International Dimensions of State Terrorism,” in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, The 
State as Terrorist : the Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1984), p. 43.  
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terrorism now widely used to denote the systematic use of terror by non-governmental 
actors. Nevertheless we should not lose sight of the fundamental truth that one cannot 
adequately understand terrorist movements without paying some attention to the effects of 
the use of force and violence by states. Indeed some of the best historical case-studies of the 
use of factional terrorism as a weapon vividly demonstrate how state violence often help to 
provoke and fuel the violence of terrorist movements.5  
 
While study about war, crime, and non-state terrorism have been intensively 
studied and theorized, state terrorism remains understudied and virtually untheorized. In 
addition, state terrorism have rarely been systematically studied within a single 
framework or comparatively.   
However, there are some efforts by some scholars who try to define the concept 
of state terrorism. In this regard, according to Laqueuer, state terrorism refers to ‘acts of 
terror carried out by governments against their own population, including systematic 
intimidation, arrests, killings and other means of coercion. This is usually directed against 
political opponents, but it can also effect sections of the population considered 
‘objectively’ harmful, and it has been, on occasion, altogether indiscriminate.’6  
Primoratz points out that there are two tendencies in the discussion of state 
terrorism. First tendency is based on the assumption that ‘what the state does has a 
certain kind of legitimacy, while those challenging it tend to be perceived as the forces of 
the disorder and destruction, engaged in clearly unjustifiable pursuits. The second 
tendency, is the double standard of the form ‘Us vs. Them.’ For instance, in dealing with 
insurgency, the general public and the media tend to support the state. In this way, when 
insurgents abroad are sponsored by our state, we do not call them terrorist, but rather 
guerrillas, freedom fighters, and the like.7  
 In accordance with Primoratz, Selden and So point out that in state terrorism, a 
state systematically directs violence against the civilian population of its own or another 
                                            
5 Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, The State as Terrorist : the Dynamics of Governmental Violence and 
Repression, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), p.7. 
6 Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, (Boston, Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1987), p. 145.  
7 Igor Primoratz, “State Terrorism and Counter-terrorism,” in Terrorism The Philosophical Issue, Igor 
Primoratz (eds), (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004), p. 113. 
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state. Drawing on this point, they define state terrorism as ‘systematic state violence 
against civilians in violation of international agreements, state edicts, and precedents 
established by international courts designed to protect the rights of civilians.’8 In this 
regard, while certain acts of violence perpetrated by individuals and groups against the 
state or its citizens are often labeled as terrorism, violent acts committed by the state 
against a civilian population have rarely been conceived in these terms, despite the clarity 
of international law in defining such as terrorist. 9 Moreover, Martin points out that 
terrorism by states is characterized by official government support for policies of 
violence, repression and intimidation. This violence and coercion, according to Martin, is 
directed against perceived enemies that the state has determined as threatened its 
interest or security.10 
 In a slightly different way, Gilbert notes that state terrorism has many of the 
features of war, of a war fought by an army of occupation, say, against partisans, or of a 
war fought by the state against rebels. The aim of its operations is to remove obstacles to 
state control of a territory by shooting, taking prisoners, destroying strongholds, cutting 
off supplies, breaking up command structures, and preventing aid being given by the 
civilian population.11  
Gilbert argues that the distinctive of state terrorism is its use of political 
assassination, of torture and other cruelties against opponents. Such acts are 
indisputably contrary to the rules of war, as preserve in the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions. They involve deliberate attacks on identifiable protected persons or 
mistreatment of enemy forces. Their routine and unremarked occurrence in state 
terrorist campaigns betokens the secrecy of the war or warlike activities in which the 
state is enganged. State terrorism involves warlike intentions which are impeded by 
constraints from issuing in open war. Thus, the intention to achieve the aims of war is 
                                            
8 Mark Selden and Alvin Y.So, War and State Terrorism : The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific, 
(Lanham, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, Inc. 2004), p. 6.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, Second Edition, (California: Sage 
Publications, Inc.), 2006, p. 111.  
11 Paul Gilbert, Terrorism, Security and Nationality : An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy, (New 
York: Routledge, 1994), p. 128.  
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usually denied by the state, even when its national elites often used the rethoric of 
winning a ‘war against terrorism’.12 
 
Forms of State Terrorism  
The use of terror in international and domestic affairs is common and the state has been 
and remain a more conductor of terrorism than insurgents with greater effect. There are 
variety of state involvement with terrorism. As Primoratz points out that many states 
have used terrorism in international affairs particularly as a mean to achieve foreign 
policy objectives, in the course of waging war, or as a method of maintaining their 
occupation of another people’s land.13  
Stohl argues that the state is as much as a user of terror in its international affairs 
as in its domestic activities. He describes three broad forms of state terrorism in 
international affairs. Sirst is coercive diplomacy. The aim of this form of state terrorism is 
to make nonconformity with a particular political demand. He points out that although 
threat is communicated by actions of the state openly, threat may be implicit and often 
nonverbal. In other words, coercive diplomacy is overt behavior. The parties to the 
conflict are fully aware of the nature of threat.14 Following this rational, we could examine 
Israel’s behavior in relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Israel 
invaded Lebanon in June 1982, in order to halt the PLO ability to attack the Israeli 
settlement near the Lebanese border. Israeli retaliation and bombing raids are designed 
to instill fear as they are to produce damage. The Israel required PLO to surrender and 
leave Lebanon or would face a full scale assault. The target of the raids and the 
intimidation and threat was the population of Beirut as well as the PLO itself. In this way, 
the widening target was designed to increase the pressure on the PLO to surrender by 
convincing the people of Beirut, through the threat of destruction, that expelling the 
PLO, was their best interest.15  
                                            
12 Ibid., p. 129.  
13 Primoratz, op.cit., p. 116.  
14Michael Stohl, ‘International Dimensions of State Terrorism,’ in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, op.cit., 
p. 44.  
15 Ibid., p.45 
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The Israel also did the same form of state terrorism when they invaded Lebanon, 
once again, in July 2006. The Israel launched full scale attack on Beirut to end the 
Hezbollah. In this way, Israel demanded to weakened and destroyed Hezbollah, just as 
the PLO had to be evicted from Lebanon in 1982. However, the target of the raids and 
threat was not only to convince the people of Lebanon and Hezbollah per se, but also to 
enhance the credibility of threats against Iran by eliminating a Lebanese-based deterrent 
to possible attack.   
 The second form of state terrorism is covert behavior. The clandestine services of 
the national state are responsible for these actions. The actions were conducted by 
government agents which operate across the country and the targets are national elites 
or foreign society. In this type of state terrorism, the state attempt to intimidate 
government officials directly through campaigns of bombing, attacks, assassinations, and 
sponsoring and participation in attempt coups d’etat. Alternatively, national states 
participate in destabilization of other societies with the purpose of creating chaos and 
conditions for the collapse of governments, the weakening of national state, and changes 
in leadership.16  
This forms of state terrorism is not directly aimed at producing conformity but 
rather fear and chaos. It is hoped that as a result of increased fear and chaos, 
governments at some point will be in a weaker bargaining position or have a different 
composition induced by terror. For instance, the clandestine services of the United States 
have had much experience in the past decades in this type of behavior. The organization 
most often responsible for such behavior is the Central Inteligence Agency. A listing of 
well-known CIA special operations indicates the range of such activities. For instance in 
Guatemala, 1954; Iran, 1953; Indonesia, 1958; the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, 1961, the US trained, 
equipped, and provided tactical assistance to groups attempting to overthrow 
established governments.17 
 The third categories of state terrorism is surrogate terrorism. This form involve 
assistance to another state or insurgent organization that makes it possible or improves 
the capability of that actor to practice terrorism. Since the obvious effect and intent of 
                                            
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid., p. 51.  
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the assistance provided is the improvement of assisted actor’s ability to either carry out 
terrorist actions to maintain regimes rule or to create chaos and/or the eventual 
overthrow of an identified enemy state regime.18 In this regard, when governments train 
the personnel that conduct terror operations, consult with and advise – for state reasons 
–  the security services of a ‘friendly’ state in its use of terrorism, this tool is a forms of 
surrogate terrorism.19 For instance, the professionalization of Latin American police 
forces was the object of the International Police Academy and the Intenational Police 
Services, Inc. The latter is a CIA-sponsored organization that also had students from Asia 
and Africa.20    
Moving on from international affairs, state terrorism may conduct in domestic 
activities. In this regard, state terrorism is directed internally against domestic enemies. 
As Primoratz points out, this form of state terrorism is defined by the sustained use of 
terrorism against their own population. In this case, totalitarian states, such as Nazy 
Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, or Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia are the best 
example of state terrorism as domestic policy. 21 
 However, Primoratz argues that not only totalitarian states use terrorism as 
domestic policy, but many non-totalitarian states, including many democratic and liberal 
states have used terrorism on a limited scale and for more specific purposes. The states 
may done directly or indirectly by sponsoring non-state actors to conduct terrorism. 
Primoratz points out that several totalitarian states have used terrorism against their own 
population directly by having state agencies such as the armed forces or security services. 
In this case, he points out many military dictatorships in South America and elsewhere as 
examples of this form of state terrorism. For instance, Chile under Augusto Pinochet and 
Argentina under the generals. While, other states have used terrorism indirectly by 
sponsoring death squads.22 For example, Brazilian government established a special force 
which conduct terrorist operations, widely known Esquadrao da Morte (“Death Squad”). 
However, knowledge of the establishment of the Death Squad in Brazil did not reduce 
                                            
18 Ibid., p. 44. 
19 Ibid., p. 54. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Primoratz, op.cit., p. 115.  
22 Ibid.  
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American assistance to Brazilian security efforts. Death squads have appeared in some 
Latin American states whose military and police were supported and trained by the 
United States. 
 According to Martin, state terrorism as domestic policy refers to the state’s 
politically motivated application of force inside its own borders. The state’s military, law 
enforcement, and other security institutions are used to suppress perceived threat. These 
institutions can also be supplemented with assistance from unofficial paramilitaries and 
death squads. The purpose of domestically focused terrorism is to demonstrate the 
supreme power of the government and to intimidate or eliminate the opposition. Martin 
notes apartheid system of racial separation in South Africa as an example. During 
apartheid era, the South African government began a covert campaign to eliminate 
antiapartheid leaders and supporters, when confronted by a combination of 
antiapartheid reformist agitation, mass unrest, and terrorist attack. This included 
government support for the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party in its violence against 
multiethnic and multiracial African National Congress (ANC). The South African 
government also assigned security officers to command death squads called Askaris, who 
assassinated ANC members both inside and outside South Africa.23  
 
The Question of Moral Justifications  
In the discussion of whether state terrorism can morally be justified, there are two 
different point of views which claim that it is morally wrong and it is not morally wrong. 
From the consequentialist point of view, terrorism, whether it is perpetrated by state or 
non-state agents is not morally wrong or impermissible and it all depends on the 
consequences that are going to have in certain circumstances. In this way, terrorism is 
impermissible when its consequences are bad, but when its consequences are good, 
terrorism is pemissible and have moral justification. In a consequentialist point of view, 
the question of moral status of terrorism is exclusively the question of its 
consequences.24  
                                            
23 Gus Martin, op.cit., p. 131.  
24 Igor Primoratz, ‘the Morality of Terrorism,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy, No. 14, 1997, p. 222.  
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 According to Primoratz, some consequentialists emphasize that those who resort 
to terrorism tend not to take the need for moral justification seriously enough. Indeed, it 
is difficult to satisfy the requirements of its consequentialist justification. He argues that 
in all such cases, a consequentialist who consistent with her position will have to draw the 
conclusion that terrorism is morally justified.25  
 Another point of view which justify acts of terrorism come from deontologist 
theory, offered by Virginia Held. Her main idea is that terrorism can be justified under 
certain circumstances in terms of basic human rights. She argues that in general, social 
action cannot be properly judged exclusively in lights of its consequences, but we should 
apply the concepts of rights and duties. In dealing with terrorism, we must focus on the 
fact that terrorist violate rights, then asking whether such violations can be morally 
justified. As Held says, ‘If we say that no violations of rights are justified, even in this case, 
this can become a disguised recipe for maintaining the status quo. If we permit violations, 
we risk undermining the moral worth of the very rights for which we are striving to 
achieve respect.’26 She further argues that the question of the moral justification of 
terrorism is a special case of the general question whether we may violate certain rights 
in order to ensure the respect of other rights. Thus, terrorism violates basic human rights 
of its victims.27 In the words of Virginia Held : 
It seems reasonable, I think, that on grounds of justice, it is better to equalize rights 
violations in a transition to bring an end to rights violations than it is to subject a given group 
that has already suffered extensive rights violations to continued such violations, if the 
degree of severity of the two violations to continued violations, if the degree of severity of 
the two violations is similar…If we must have rights violations, a more equitable distribution 
of such violations is better than a less equitable distribution.28  
 
Furthermore, Gilbert believes that state terrorism can morally be justified. He also 
believes that many states defend their acts of terrorism as morally better justified than 
                                            
25 Ibid., p. 223.  
26 Virginia Held, “Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals,’ in R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, Violence, 
Terrorism, and Justice, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 73; Primoratz, ‘Morality of 
Terrorism,’ op.cit., p. 229.  
27 Ibid., p. 229.  
28 Virginia Held, op.cit., p. 79-80.  
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the campaigns of terror by non-state agents. In this sense, the moral superiority claimed 
for counter-terrorist actions is supposed to be founded on the fact that they preserve due 
process of law, while terrorist campaigns are carried on through breaches of it.29 He 
further argues that in non-state terrorist point of view, the state is founded on organized 
violence, thus the actions of the state against opponents are not morally different in 
principle from the actions of non-state terrorist.30 As an example, Gilbert points out the 
IRA allegation to the British Security Forces whose shot three of their members without 
warning or provocation. This allegation is similar to a charge of state terrorism. However, 
this allegation does not reply to state condemnation. As Gilbert says : 
This must be that the legally sanctioned measures which the state bring to bear against 
terrorists themselves depend on the use or threat of violence, which the state bring to bear 
against terrorist themselves depend on the use or threat of violence, which is dignified as 
legal only because the state openly sanctions it. Since this is so, it is argued, there is no moral 
distinction between the actions of terrorists in seeking to gain power and those of the 
agents of the state in seeking to retain it. Hence there is no moral case for regarding the 
former as criminal and the latter as not only permissible but justified as the prevention or 
punishment of crime.31  
 
Regarding the earlier question of whether state terrorism is morally wrong, Gilbert 
claims that it is not, morally speaking. He argues that state terrorism can morally be 
justified for two reasons. First, generally speaking, criminality of terrorism does not show 
that is morally wrong. He assumes that ‘if killings in wartime may in certain circumstances 
be morally permissible then it is hard to see how acts of terrorism committed in similar 
circumstances may not be.’32 He further argues that ‘if an act of state terrorism were 
morally permissible as an act of war then the state should acknowledge it as a war. If it 
does not, it can scarcely secure the justification that acts of war can have.’33  
                                            
29 Paul Gilbert, op.cit., p. 126.  
30 Ibid., p. 127.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., p. 132. 
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 The second reason for rejecting the suggestion that state terrorism is morally 
wrong because criminal, that state terrorism may not even count as criminal. In this way, 
he argues that the state’s refusal to acknowledged its own activities as war does not 
require it to treat these activities as criminal, even if they count as such by laws enforced 
elsewhere. As Gilbert notes, ’the state can legalise its own terrorist acts while they remain 
terrorist, because they do not occur as part of an openly acknowledged war. They still 
count as terrorist, we might say, because they involve, simply to serve state policy, 
breaches of rules we expect, in those circumstances, to be expressed in law.’34 Gilbert 
concludes that because of there is no alternative to a resort to violence in pursuit of the 
terrorist’s aims, so there is usually no alternative to it in the state’s maintenance of power 
– what is known as national security.35   
In contrast from those views, Coady believes that acts of terrorism is morally 
wrong. He argues that terrorism violates a central principle of the jus in bello – the 
principle which declares the immunity of non-combatants from direct attack. As Coady 
says, ‘if one takes the principle of non-combatant immunity that forms a significant part 
of the jus in bello to invoke an absolute moral prohibition upon intentionally attacking 
innocent people, as just war thinkers have commonly done, then major terrorism is 
always wrong and always permissible.’36  
In accordance with Coady, Primoratz believes that terrorism ‘almost absolutely 
wrong,’ thereby endorsing a very strong moral presumption against terrorism and the 
targeting civilians.37 He further argues that state terrorism is morally worse than non-
state terrorism. He notes four reasons : first, acts of terrorism by the state has made a 
remarkable destruction to civilians rather than terrorism by non-state agents. As 
Laqueuer says that ‘acts of terror carried out by police states and tyrannical 
governments, in general, have been responsible for thousand times more victims and 
                                            
34 Ibid., p. 133.  
35 Ibid., p. 140.  
36 C.A.J. (Tony) Coady, “Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency,” in Igor Primoratz, State Terrorism 
and Counter-terrorism, op.cit., p. 81. 
37 Primoratz, ‘Morality of Terrorism,’ op.cit., p. 231. 
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more misery than all actions of individual terrorism taken together.’38 Primoratz argues 
that : 
No matter how much non-state terrorist manage to enrich their equipment and improve 
their organization, planning, and methods of action, they stand no chance of ever 
significantly changing the score. No insurgent, no matter how well funded, organized, 
determined, and experienced in the methods of terrorism, can hope to come to close to the 
killing, maiming, and overall destruction on the scale the Royal Air Force and US Airforce 
visited on German and Japanese cities in World War II, or to the psychological devastation 
and subsequent physical liquidation of millions in Soviet and Nazi camps.39  
 
In term of victims, Primoratz argues that the number of civilians killed in acts of 
terrorism by the state was more excessive. He compare the number of victims of the act 
of terrorism by non-state agents in the United States on September 11, 2001, with victims 
of the Allies’ terror bombing campaign against Germany. On September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attack, the number of victims are approximately 7,000 and the media labeled this horrible 
event as ‘the most devastating terrorist attack in history.’ However, if we look at the 
number of people killed in bombing campaign in Germany, this would change the claim by 
the media. On July 27, 1943, the RAF launched a ‘Firestorm Raid’ attack on Hamburg 
where there were about 40,000 civilians killed.40 From this example, we could conclude 
that acts of state terrorism is more severe in term of victims than acts of terrorism by 
non-state agents.  
 Second, in term of secrecy, he argues that state terrorism is always conducted by 
secrecy, deception and hypocrisy. In contrast, non-state terrorism generally not secretive, 
not deceive the public and not hypocrite in proclaiming their involvement under the 
notions of morality. In the words of Primoratz : 
When involved in terrorism – whether perpetrated by its own agencies or by proxy – a state 
will be acting clandestinely, disclaiming any involvement, and declaring its adherence to 
values and principles that rule it out. Or, if it is impractical and perhaps even 
counterproductive to deny involvement, it will do its best to present its actions to at least 
                                            
38 Walter Laqueur, op.cit., p. 146 
39 Primoratz, State Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, op.cit., p. 118 
40 Ibid. 
Jurnal Pertahanan Maret 2014, Volume 4, Nomor 1     111 
 
some audiences in a different light: as legitimate acts of war, or acts done in defense of state 
security. It will normally be able to do that without much difficulty…41 
  
The third reason, relates to the international convention signed by the state. 
According to Primoratz, assorted declarations of human rights or conventions and 
agreements are prohibit the act resort to terrorism. In this regard, in today’s world, all 
states are signatories to most of those conventions and agreements, whereas those who 
engage in non-state terrorism are not signatories of any kind of conventions. Following 
this rationale, he argues that ‘when a state is involved in terrorism, it acts in breach of this 
own solemn international commitments. This particular charge cannot be brought against 
those resorting to non-state terrorism.’42 
 Forth reason, lies on the justification of ‘no alternative’ argument. Primoratz 
argues that it is not possible for the state to use ‘no alternative’ argument to conduct 
terrorism. In contrast, he notes that it is possible to apply ‘no alternative’ argument to 
justify acts of terrorism by non-state agents. Referring to a case where people were being 
oppressed, humiliated and exploited by foreign rule, it is possible for freedom fighter to 
claim that the only possible way and effective method to achieve liberation is by using 
terrorism. As Primoratz says, ‘in such a situation, the “no alternative” argument would 
provide moral justification for terrorism, or at least somewhat mitigate our moral 
condemnation of its use. On the other hand, it seems virtually impossible that a state 
should find itself in such circumstances where it has no alternative to resorting to 
terrorism.’43 
 However, Primoratz acknowledged that his arguments could be challenged, 
especially in regards to his fourth argument. By the notion of ‘supreme emergency’ it is 
argued that the Allies’ terror bombing campaign against the civilian population of 
Germany could be justified. According to this point of view, it is allowed for a person to 
put aside moral prohibition of not to attack civilians in order to prevent moral disaster in 
the near future. According to Walzer, states can employ terrorism. The primacy of the 
                                            
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 119. 
43 Ibid., p. 120. 
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political community that Walzer sees as validating the special role of states is highly 
suspect.44 As Michael Walzer says, ‘for the truth is that the supreme emergency passed 
long before the British bombing reached its crescendo. The greater number by far of the 
German civilians killed by terror bombing were killed without moral (and probably 
without military) reason.’45 
 Primoratz also highlights another notion countering his argument. Referring to 
the notion of ‘balance of terror’, it seems that acts of terrorism by the state can be 
justified as well as ‘no alternative’ argument. In this regard, the balance of terror is the 
product of mutual threat of nuclear attack in the Cold War era. The threat in this sense is 
the threat of attacking civilian population center of other state. Primoratz argues that ‘if 
that threat was morally justified, it was a case of state terrorism justified by the ‘no 
alternative’ argument. However, he insists that those actions perpetrated by the state is 
morally wrong. In the words of Primoratz : 
Clearly, carrying out the threat and actually destroying major population centers of the enemy 
and killing hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of enemy civilians, could never morally be 
justified. But does that mean that a threat to do so – made with the aim of preventing the 
chain of events that would make such destruction a serious option – is also morally 
impermissible?46  
 
To answer this question, he further argues that ‘the threat need not involve the 
intention of ever carrying it out; a bluff will do. Yet one might well wonder if a threat of 
this sort can be both credible and bluff. Of course, if the threat is not credible, it will not 
be morally justified either.’47 Furthermore, at the same tone with Primoratz, Glover 
argues that ‘full-blooded state terrorism is normally a much worse evil than unofficial 
terrorism.’48  
 
                                            
44 C.A.J. (Tony) Coady, “Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency,” op.cit., p. 89.  
45 Ibid., Michael Walzer, Just and Just Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, third edition, 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 261. 
46 Primoratz, “State Terrorism and Counter-terrorism,” op.cit., p. 121. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Jonathan Glover, “State Terrorism,” in R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, Violence, Terrorism, and 
Justice, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 274.  
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Conclusion  
The moral justification of terrorism whether perpetrated by state or non-state agents 
always open to question. The discussion of state terrorism offered in this essay therefore, 
indicates that there are different perspectives which claim that acts of terrorism by state 
or non-state agents can be or can not be morally justified. From consequentalist and 
deontologist point of views, acts of terrorism can morally be justified and it is not morally 
wrong. For consequentialist, the question of moral justifications depend on the question 
of its consequences, whether it is good or bad will result to the conclusion that terrorism 
is not morally wrong or it is morally wrong. Furthermore, from deontologist point of view, 
acts of terrorism whether perpetrated by state or non-state agents, can morally be 
justified in terms of basic human rights. However, this claim can not absolutely be 
defended. As Primoratz argues that terrorism is ‘almost absolutely wrong’ and referring 
to Coady, terrorism is indeed violates the principle of jus in bello where non-combatants 
(civilians) have immunity from direct attack either by state or non-state agents. Following 
these rationales, terrorism perpetrated by state or non-state agents can not morally be 
justified and it is morally wrong and even worse than non-state terrorism.  
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